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of Europe in Taussig's wake. And yet, facing this approach that looks at the matter from the surface, from mimicry, the dialectical reversal Rouch attempts to bring across, an explanation more structural in kind, has to give way for the moment to the phenomenological one of Taussig's.
Diverse as these views are, they agree on one point: they all aim at questioning the ethical underpinning of Les mattres fous and, in a larger sense, of ethnographic filmmaking. Sembene's accusation, which might not be entirely fair to Rouch, had also aimed at that higher level of moral concern.6 In response, Rouch told him how he had taken pains, whenever he showed the film, not to let Les maftres fous spark racist perceptions or fall into the wrong use (Cervoni 1982, 78) . His disclaimer in French at the film's opening and his insistence on dubbing the film in English by himself (Rouch 1978 hardly any other film genre need undergo such a straining moment of soul-searching to define its identity. In the majority of cases, the ethical code such as the one laid down by the American Anthropological Association,7 add Barbash and Taylor, "is more abstract than practical," according to their hands-on experience (48). Trinh T. Minh-ha's thesis that "There is no such thing as documentary" (1991, 29) , however radical it is as an attempt to reassert the identity of documentary, may need a further negation by the ethical anxiety we have mentioned to claim this identity.
We bring up the issue of context and background because the lack of them, or the impossibility to provide them-or simply ones that are convincing enough for one reason or another-is often the source of anxiety. We see Rouch wrestle with it, but the embarrassment is perhaps more common than we assume. In his essay "Who Constructs Anthropological Knowledge?" Wilton Martinez reports similar unpleasant encounters in his anthropology classroom (1992, 132). Indigenous media produced by aboriginal people about themselves are not spared, either: when shown, the films must be respectfully "re-contextualized" with sufficient anthropological information (Ruby 1995, 80) .8 In the case of Les maftres fous, Peter Loizos, noting that in virtually all Stoller's screening sessions there is at least one student who throws up (Stoller 1992, 158 ), would rather screen the students before he screens the film for them: he will pick, whenever he can, "the final-year anthropology specialists" as his chosen audience (Loizos 1993, 48-49) . To see a cocksure-and for that reason, unscrupulous-filmmaker at the screening explaining his or her documentary with pleasure may not be a very good sign, for decontextualization might have taken effect, causing the audience to show little interest in the film's context. If they are not happy to be anthropologically informed, it is because the filmmaker has not cared to be informed in the first place.
Like it or not, we are here given an establishing shot of what Eliot
Weinberger has identified as "the Camera People," whose first record of being sighted is also the one ringing with ethical resonance: "There is a tribe," he begins his field notes, "known as the ethnographic filmmakers, who believe they are invisible" (1994, 3). Which is to say, they did not know that they could also become insects. The call for ethics arises not because the Camera People are hunters of images that they prefer to consume raw (3), but because they move in sheer visuality, all-seeing but not seen, seemingly having no concern for their own visibility (as one would say, "for their own safety"). It is not clear whether this unscrupulousness is part of the nature of their trade, essential to the hunt of visuality, or because they hold no scruples at all, and for that reason, no taboos as a people. This is very strange, for we have known no tribe that does not at least reckon some of those fears. The call for ethics on our part is an apparent attempt to answer this mystical origin of that hunting trade, filling up the possible ethical vacuum that we suspect is there. Perhaps our actual fear is less with this people than with visuality, that which they hunt as some very ferocious game. If we cannot tame visuality, at least, we think, we can tame the Camera People. So, like the missionaries, we hand them our bible, our code of ethics. Some of those tribal men and women soon convert to our faith, but they also begin to develop anxiety attacks. The most conscientious of them, knowing that they carry an original sin, begin to raise doubt about our bible, which they have been asked to bring along to cure the plague caused simply by their presence that has turned others into insects.9 Again, it is visuality, still at large, that has worked all this mess; there must be something heretical about the Camera People that has brought our bible to a stall. Pointing out to them that they are also insects serves only to concede the omnipotence of visuality, not the other way round. Our view is that the riddle cannot be resolved without conducting an anthropological inquiry of the tribe. Weinberger has meant to use the title "the Camera People" as a convenient metaphor in his brilliant account of them; we want to take the name as an anthropo- (Rouch 1978 (Rouch , 1006 . Meanwhile, heavily charged in this force was the colonial fantasy of the colonized, triggering, as he once witnessed without filming, a "military parade of the Hauka" with about "one hundred of them possessed" (1007).14 Thirty years into his research by 1971, he had "attended several hundred possession ceremonies" and "filmed about 20 of them" (Rouch [1971] 1978, 2-3).15 But why film? Apparently, the force and intensity of the possession rite had pressed him for some filmic kind of surrealist unruliness over an immediate political interpretation. A few lines down, his interviewer adds, it is in fact both "maximum joy and maximum tragic furor" that Rouch has been filming. The jerkiness of his handheld 16mm camera in Les maftres fous testifies precisely to this excessiveness, both horrid and trancelike.
The general viewing reactions, the political ones aside (to which we will return), are a bizarre surrealist pastiche when pieced together. The British, then ruling Ghana, banned the film, while the mad "priests" in the film would again be possessed as soon as they saw themselves on the screen (Rouch 1978 (Rouch , 1009 (Fischer 1997, 141 ). But it is too late; Diawara's cinema verite is dead. Fischer's criticism of him for being "chiasmatic" with Rouch is partly accurate (141): Diawara does seek to "cross-breed" with him but stalls at the crucial moment when his political judgment of Rouch is passed in full force. Unfortunately, it is easy to blame Rouch for being sly and shrewd, yet harder to blame Diawara for giving up the provocative cinema verite prematurely. In fact, Diawara could have scripted no comfortable judgment beforehand, which his camera might script for him, should it click into place. And had it been wild enough, Rouch could very likely have eaten a dog on screen. With Diawara's camera ceasing to track and spin, the provocative anthropology of Rouch's kind also ceases to roll, leaving behind our political judgment as the greatest mystery of all, now staring forlornly into these existences: the mad masters and their sacrificed dog, the visual excess, the reason of filming, the presence of the camera, as well as the limit of our political judgment.
OF MIMICRY AND WHITE MAN
It is in this light that Taussig's approach becomes neatly pertinent: he is one of the few critics who are able to take visual dialectical reversal into consideration in his political understanding of mimicry. We want to resume from here the "mimicry talk" that begins this essay and go on to contend instead that what lies in Les maitres fous is more than a matter of mimicry. It is easy to understand why Taussig The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority. [The colonial subjects are then] the figures of a doubling, the part-objects of a metonymy of colonial desire which alienates the modality and normality of those dominant discourses in which they emerge as "inappropriate" colonial subjects.... It is a desire that reverses "in part" the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer's presence; a gaze of otherness. ([1984] 1994, 88-89)
The function of the gaze pointed out by Bhabha is what has jolted
Taussig's subjectivity in a series of dialectical reversals, explaining why the reverse gaze from the colonized must carry "a hidden threat" (Bhabha [1984] 1994, 89). The otherness, be it the wooden figurines or living subjects in trance, presents as its gaze the "form of difference that is mimicry-almost the same but not quite ... [a]lmost the same but not white" (89).
Like Taussig after him,28 Bhabha now wants to suggest that "mimicry" amounts to a successful form of colonial resistance by itself (Moore-Gilbert 1997, 181). To him, colonial mimicry is no more than a matter of performativity seeking to achieve the hybridity of culture; if hybridity is regarded as a triumph, it is because mimicry, whose "performance" yields hybrid effects, is often menacing enough.29 Once mimicry is assured to be happening, according to Bhabha, the only struggle left is for one to claim the "authorship" of this performativity: gives rise to the Caribbean cultures, for instance], by insisting on the incommensurable aspects of cultural differences" (181). Laid bare to us is also the fact that hybridity, at least in Bhabha's understanding, is no more than a matter of the surface (performativity). Its lack of "depth," of structurality, nicely explains why the dialectics of sublation that Moore-Gilbert brings up cannot subsist here. Similarly, mimicry must also remain on the "surface":32 it exists by being detected by the Other (the white man) as the gaze (from the natives), even though the natives do not actually "look back," whose subjectivity is not in any case determined (structurally, dialectically) by their own alleged mimicry. In this case, mimicry is taken as an element to structure only the white man's subjectivity and exists as such.
It is interesting to see that both Taussig and Bhabha have taken pains to work on a theory of resistance that turns out to be that of the white man's existence. With a twisted logic, they want to call the mimicry he perceives as the "resistance" by the colonized. The paradox does not stop there: as can be inferred from Stoller, the natives may not, and structurally cannot (since they are not white men), learn of the existence of their so-called resistance. If all our critics are correct in their speculations, this "resistance" must have sprung out of the misrecognition of the white man, who happens to discover the gaze from unlikely places. This does not sound like good news to the natives, for their identity remains unrecognized even after the white man's self-enlightening "second contact" with them.33 There is a further problem caused by the concept of the gaze formulated by Bhabha. His underlying assumption is that the "gaze" from the colonizer can always be thwarted by the "reverse gaze" of the natives-as is pictured here by Moore-Gilbert: the disciplinary gaze of the colonizer is destabilized anamorphically by a blind-spot, which is the consequence of the crucial differentiation which the strategy of mimicry requires between being English and being "Anglicized." (1997, 120) Despite his reference to Lacan, Bhabha's understanding of the gaze is Foucauldian ([1984] 1994, 90). Michel Foucault's description of the "faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception" in light of the panopticon (1977, 214) does not yet reach the structural level of Jacques-Alain Miller's psychoanalytic account, according to which this panoptic gaze is menacing, because the recognizing gaze that internally sustains the subject's identity has been externally hijacked by the panoptic device.34 What is new in Bhabha is that he goes beyond Foucault by suggesting that the panoptic gaze can be "mimicked" and turned into a recognizing gaze that looks back; Taussig's unsettling "second contact" confirms this. A Lacanian perspective allows us to explain what has happened in what Bhabha and Taussig detect: the gaze internal to the white man (structural to the subjectivity as a gaze would be) has been unexpectedly hijacked by the natives' alleged "mimicry," being misrecognized now as the "reverse gaze." That is to say, if the "reverse gaze" exists at all, it must first do so within the white man's identity, only that it is "hijacked" later as "reverse." On the other hand, nothing has changed in the natives' subjectivity; the colonizer's gaze (or rather, the gaze internally overlooking the natives as hijacked by him) has never been "destabilized" by them at all. Their colonial fate is sealed, with no "resistance" to come along.35
Taussig may at this moment ask: Is what we see in Les maitres fous not the mad priests' mimicry of the colonizers? Do the possession scenes not amount to a resistance by revealing to the Europeans that it is they who are actually insane, not the Africans, as Rouch's interpretation insists ([1981] 1989, 270; 1978, 1007)? Our answer is: granted that there is a political resonance as indicated, we have only explained how the incident is perceived by the Westerners, not quite how it has come about among the mad priests in terms of their structure of desire. For that reason, we still cannot answer, among other riddles, why they should get possessed at all to mimic the colonizer. We know, as they also know, that sacrificing a dog is not a very pleasant experience, which seldom gets practiced unless there is a trance. It would be very unintelligent for us to believe that they eat a dog in order to put on a "political resistance." Perhaps it sounds more reasonable to think that they munch our canine friend in order to also mimic the Westerners, who are equally ferocious in terms of their colonialist enterprise, if our theory of mimicry should make any sense. In this case, it is better for us to allow a political interpretation to intervene, so as to shy away from anything about the mad priests-about, for instance, what they are subliminally cogitating when they tear man's best friend limb from limb. As a cushion against the shock of the "second contact," our theory of mimicry is therefore invented to do nothing but dream, literally: it dreams the dream of the father of the burning child,36 who speaks with an imploring gaze, "Father, don't you see I'm eating a dog?" The child's gaze is essentially a recognizing gaze, which also sustains the desire of the theorists. If they should get recognized, they too would have to eat a dog; otherwise, they had better follow the father of the dead child by continuing to dream in their consciousness after waking up, to weave theories around themselves as if doing so with the signifiers (Lacan [1964] 1981, 70). Soon all the mimicry talk will get churned out, to be supported by the illusion that "the colonizer's gaze" can be thwarted by the "reverse gaze" qua the "mimicry" the natives allegedly put on.
If we are honest with ourselves that our greatest fear has been the need to sample the dog meat, the fear for which we begin to mimic the mimicry talk, we are halfway to explaining why the mad priests have to gobble up a dog. In case this explanation still sounds too vague to follow, let us try the psychoanalytic one: they eat a dog because they cannot dream; the gaze is too near.37 Inferentially, they cannot mimic anyone, in a strictly Lacanian sense. Mimicry is to Lacan a matter of "becoming mottled ... against a mottled back- In Les maitres fous, therefore, Rouch's camera turns out to be what breaks the taboo for the priests to slaughter a dog, all the more so because he has been invited to film them (1006). Appalled at seeing a dog slashed and skinned, he begins to feel uneasy that they may do the same to the toddlers nearby (1991, 100). There is no reason why a baby cannot be treated like a puppy, given that the white lords have set the precedent: they wipe out entire villages wherever they go by their presence as part of the epidemics they bring (Levi-Strauss [1955] 1973, 39).
The possibility of this all-powerful presence translates into that of the existence of these contraptions: the panopticon, camera, and visual anthropology, to name a few, all being the white man's devices to hijack the gaze that structures the subjectivity of a colonized subject. In the last analysis, they are meant to stand in for the white man's presence. Inviting a camera to intervene, the Hauka priests are conjuring up this presence as a Hauka spirit; for its ferocity to be unleashed in full force, all taboos must be broken. That includes literally eating a dog. This is a sublime moment, in which the priests and the gaze upon themselves unite into one singularity, assuming a new presence by mumbling to Rouch through their frothing mouths: "White Father, don't you see we're eating a dog?" By which they are equally asking, "don't you see we're filming?"47 It is hard not to see that they are also producing an ethnographic documentary about the callous Camera People and their hunt for visuality, given that the possession itself is now such a hunting excursion. As soon as the gaze that has stepped upon the mad priests and trashed them as insects is captured, they and their dog become one. It is only at this sublime moment of sheer enjoyment (jouissance) that all others, except themselves, become insects. Now if we look back at the whole "mimicry" talk, the only complaint we have is that "mimicry" is too gentle and too mild a concept to sustain the violence involved in the hunt for visuality. In particular, the concept falls short of a structural explanation of the most sinister aspect of colonialism, which is to implant the white man's desires in the colonized.48 This "enterprise" involves a series of intricate dialectical relations the "mimicry" talk has unwittingly glossed over. To further point out what they have missed, let us recapitulate, by way of conclusion, our theory in terms of the Hauka possession.49
First Dialectical Relation
It all starts out by the mad masters being recognized as nothing by the gaze now usurped by the white man. It is as if they found him in sheer visuality speaking to them in their dream by using the N-word: "don't you see you're insects?" Worse still, they can hardly wake up from their nightmare: in their waking life, the same visuality lingers in order to torment them, as if it were the only entity in the universe that is not bound by any taboo. Soon their own universe begins to evolve around it; their only concern becomes always this luminous, all-seeing white man.
It is easy to see why our ethical codes (developed by our "civil society") can do very little to overcome such an awful situation, which is not merely historical, but also structural in kind. If we understand historicality to be inherently structural in itself, we will not so easily give in to the hope that these codes alone can remove the structural plague caused by the presence of the white man. We by no means want to advise against their use, but to point out the immense difficulty they may structurally happen to overlook. In particular, the codes may lure us into performing mimicry in the Lacanian sense to suture ourselves by not detecting the dialectical relations triggered off by the gaze.
First Diatectical Reversal
It is then incumbent upon the mad masters to do something. As noted earlier, they could have chosen to compromise, like most of us. Instead, they follow the Hauka; choosing to be possessed turns out to be their ethical move. Unlike the father of the burning child dream, they approach the burning gaze that has been hijacked. When their subjectivity is dispersed in the trance, they are, as we have mentioned, united with this gaze into one singularity. As if in a dream, they could now look at themselves where the Other looks at them. Only at this moment could they, as the gaze, be identical with themselves, like Choang-tsu ( 
Second Dialectical Relation
Only we are in mimicry, in other words, not the mad masters. Until now, we have had no idea that what we witness in horror in the film Les maitres fous is anamorphosis. Seeing the colonial pomposity going awry in mad masters' "representation," we think that they are only mimicking it. We look for every rationale to tell ourselves-like the father of the burning child dream-that it is just a dream, so that we can maintain our sanity to face this burning gaze as anamorphosis that pops out from nowhere, takes us aback by recognizing us, and keeps from us the reason why we can laugh at all instead of being possessed. We are attacked by a momentary hysterical blindness, which exposes our camouflage, but soon we are salvaged by our misrecognition. Mistaking anamorphosis as mimicry is our way of continuing to dream in our consciousness-precisely, again, in the way the father of the burning child wakes up from his dream. In Lacanian terms, we are photo-graphed, written by light into the big picture, so to ward off the anamorphosis ([1964] 1981, 106 ).
Second Dialectical Reversal
The mad masters turn out to hijack our gaze and structure our identity, so long as we are in mimicry. They howl with dog flesh and blood in their mouths, brandishing knives and torches, with their limbs jerking, torsos trembling, mouths frothing, and eyes rapidly rolling: "White Father," they cry, "don't you see we're burning?" It is a surprise that we consider them only mimicking someone else; in fact, they are making a movie to capture the spirit worshiped by the Camera People. The power of the camera, as a European thing, now explains the existence of the mad priests, in accordance with what Rouch discovers in his afterthought about Les maitres fous:
My hypothesis is that they would have used a camera in the cult just as they used a gun: a crude wooden camera, and it would have been a normal part of the cult, if this [Hauka] movement had not been stopped by [Ghana's] Independence. (Rouch 1978 (Rouch ,1009 If the camera had been used at all, it is because the mad masters wanted to capture the visuality, the gaze, that had overpowered them. Even without this gadget as their prop, the hunt appears to be a success with all taboos being broken-the one on incest especially (our anamorphosis is the evidence); otherwise, we would not feel the need to pluck out our eyes.50 This is the worst meltdown scenario; the Camera People have wanted to keep it to themselves as their trade secret, but it is now seized by the mad masters. In response, the Camera People must be thinking of rallying its savage war cry in the profession. With their community presently in crisis, we can almost devise a healing prayer for them to chant: The African mad masters have ravaged our village, they lament. Let us make it a taboo that this secret be not disclosed. Let this only taboo be our trade secret. Let it be known, however, that we remain invisible in our mimicry and camouflage. To hell with the mad masters! They screwed things up by hunting down-by stealing-the gaze normally trapped inside our cameras and they did so bare-handed, without resorting to Western technology. And they had turned themselves into a camera by imposing the gaze upon us. Thank God, they got burned and ended up swallowing a dog. To hell with Jacques Lacan, who knows that they were not insane. Thank God, no one has made sense of what he says. To hell, too, with Rouch, who filmed Les maftres fous. But we should be grateful, for no one has understood what his film means.
May the film be burned, lest we all need to pluck out our eyes.... It is perhaps too late for this litany of the Camera People to summon up any fearful effect. For their smell is tracked down, their horror known. To the mad priests at least, the hunt is complete. 25. Rouch, in the meantime, has never faked any scene, which Inoussa Ousseini asserted when comparing him with Robert Flaherty (Haffner 1982, 75) " (1993, 80) .
29. Following Bhabha, Russell wants to therefore consider this performativity as an emancipative moment in Les maftres fous: "As a figure of ambivalence in colonial culture, the mimic man performs his identity. If the possession ritual represents the most 'savage' and 'crazed' figure of the Other, it also represents a subjectivity that remains uncolonized" (1999, 227). However, this possible emancipative moment must also be an ambivalent one, as there is this split of "identity" and "subjectivity" in the subject.
30. Bhabha writes elsewhere in terms of mimicry and its "authorship": "Under cover of camouflage, mimicry, like the fetish, is a part-object that radically revalues the normative knowledges of the priority of race, writing, history. a black subject (1991, 231) .
38. Lacan therefore cautions us against the mimetic implication in his use of "mimicry" as a concept: "we should not be too hasty in introducing some kind of inter-subjectivity. Whenever we are dealing with imitation, we should be careful not to think too quickly of the other who is being imitated. To imitate is no doubt to produce an image. But at bottom, it is, for the subject, to be inserted in a function whose exercise grasps it" ([1964] 1981, 100; emphasis added). 39. Bhabha never sets the gaze and mimicry dialectically to work in his conception, as does Lacanian psychoanalysis. Instead, he only teases out the notion of "camouflage" from Lacan's theory of mimicry to suggest (erroneously) that mimicry carries a mimetic "threat" from the "identity effects" produced by those who mimic ([1984] (1982, 7) . For us, her analysis seeks to, as it were, supplement Lacan's analysis of the burning child dream, though the dream is not mentioned by name. As inferred from her theory, if the father should go on dreaming, or indeed see his burning child in his waking life, he would be equally "swallowed up," "corrupted," "edged" by his child's corpse and be "expelled," abjected in his union with this gaze. His subjectivity, if it survives at all, will be hollowed out. Phobia will be his only existence-one with no correlative small other (object a) but with the sole aegis of the Other, "having dwelt in me as alter ego" (10). The reason perversion must be considered is this: "The abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them" (15).
48. Western colonialism has created in third world subjects, blacks in particular, the conscious or unconscious wish to become white, as forcefully argued by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks ([1952] 1986, 100). Citing Fanon's view, Joan Copjec concludes from a strictly psychoanalytic perspective: "the cruelest, the most insidious effect of the colonizing enterprise is that it constructs the very desires of the colonized subject" (1990, 36) .
49. The subsequent series of dialectical thinking has been inspired by Lacan's discussion of Dora's case in his "Intervention on Transference" ([1951] 1982). In no way is this a ventriloquistic effort to have the Lacanian paradigm override anthropology, if we do not forget that we have argued along the finding of anthropologist Paul Stoller, not Taussig's "second contact," which is largely a theoretical whim (Stoller 1997b, 69-70) . To substantiate, in psychoanalysis, the claim that theorists such as Taussig have been, in quite a ventriloquistic manner, dreaming the burning child dream, is our way of preserving the integrity of Les maftres fous as an ethnographic event.
50. The reference here is Oedipus. He has witnessed what happens in the primal scene: his incestuous act with his mother, after he has killed his father-a scene he cannot bear to see out of horror. He soon "tears his eyes out of their sockets," for feeling that he has been gazed at by his own eyes (Quinet 1995, 144) . See also Freud's account of the Oedipus story, the act of knowing, and the eye in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900, 4: 263).
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